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Abstract
This study identifies and explores evolving concepts of trust and privacy in the context of user-generated health data. We
define ‘‘user-generated health data’’ as data captured through devices or software (whether purpose built or commer-
cially available) and used outside of traditional clinical settings for tracking personal health data. The investigators
conducted qualitative research through semistructured interviews (n¼ 32) with researchers, health technology start-
up companies, and members of the general public to inquire why and how they interact with and understand the value of
user-generated health data. We found significant results concerning new attitudes toward trust, privacy, and sharing of
health data outside of clinical settings that conflict with regulations governing health data within clinical settings. Members
of the general public expressed little concern about sharing health data with the companies that sold the devices or apps
they used, and indicated that they rarely read the ‘‘terms and conditions’’ detailing how their data may be exploited by
the company or third-party affiliates before consenting to them. In contrast, interviews with researchers revealed
significant resistance among potential research participants to sharing their user-generated health data for purposes
of scientific study. The widespread rhetoric of personalization and social sharing in ‘‘user-generated culture’’ appears to
facilitate an understanding of user-generated health data that deemphasizes the risk of exploitation in favor of loosely
defined benefits to individual and social well-being. We recommend clarification and greater transparency of regulations
governing data sharing related to health.
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Introduction
As the ﬁeld of medicine has begun to embrace big data,
a problematic truism has taken hold: more data equals
more knowledge equals better health outcomes.
Ubiquitous environmental and lifestyle data from wear-
able technologies and mobile apps promises to uncover
new indicators of health and illness from outside of
traditional clinical settings (Steinhubl et al., 2015).
While the often-cited ‘‘Four V’s’’ of big data,
‘‘volume, variety, velocity, and veracity,’’ all hint at
the complexity of deriving straightforward insights
from these new sources of data (Raghupathi and
Raghupathi, 2014), the governing logic of many busi-
ness and research enterprises holds that the unfettered
ﬂow of data will yield real value as soon as it is coupled
with appropriate analytics. But what new kinds of
knowledge might these insights reveal and for whom
might they improve outcomes? The novel achievements
of user-generated health data rely heavily on partici-
pants’ willingness to share their data, even when
doing so may not serve their own best interests (Leaf,
2015). The question of who beneﬁts from big health
data is therefore entangled with questions about data
ownership, sharing, trust, and privacy. This study
explores how concepts of trust and privacy are chan-
ging in the context of user-generated health data and
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analyzes how researchers, start-up companies, and
members of the general public interact with and under-
stand the value of user-generated health data as a key
component of big health data.
Members of the general public, including patients,
have begun to play a newly important role in collecting
data about health and disease (Sarasohn-Kahn, 2014).
With the rise of the mobile web and the growth of
smartphone use (Rainie and Wellman, 2014), citizens’
daily lives have become experiments ‘‘in the wild,’’
whose digital traces oﬀer new opportunities and chal-
lenges to researchers seeking to gather information
about human behavior and exposures outside of the
controlled settings of lab-based studies. This phenom-
enon has emerged with the rise of ‘‘user-generated con-
tent’’ (UGC), deﬁned as content that ‘‘comes from
regular people who voluntarily contribute data, infor-
mation, or media that then appears before others in a
useful or entertaining way, usually on the Web—for
example, restaurant ratings, wikis, and videos’’
(Krumm et al., 2008; Van Dijck, 2009). As researchers
and marketers began to mine UGC for insights and
predictors of user behavior in the early 2000s, the rele-
vance to health of what might be considered incidental
data, such as global positioning system (GPS) or social
media data, quickly became apparent. In addition, the
growing popularity of wearable health and wellness
trackers, such as the Fitbit, Jawbone UP, the Apple
watch, and others, has created an abundance of user-
generated health data. Like the incidental health data
derived from GPS or social media, user-generated
health data is produced, shared, and exploited under
poorly deﬁned privacy and ownership policies
(Lupton, 2016; Neﬀ and Nafus, 2016).
In light of the growing importance of patients and
consumers in the life cycle of big health data creation
and exploitation, the need for clarity around the role of
user-generated health data in commercial and scientiﬁc
enterprises is pressing. When the Precision Medicine
Initiative (PMI) was launched in the United States in
2015, it was described as ‘‘a new way of doing research
that fosters open, responsible data sharing with the
highest regard to participant privacy, and that puts
engaged participants at the center of research eﬀorts’’
(NIH, 2015). The premise of ‘‘open, responsible data
sharing’’ rests upon the assumption that future uses of
PMI datasets would not produce harmful unintended
consequences for data donors, yet legal scholars and
data scientists have shown that data privacy is virtually
impossible to ensure (Ohm, 2010; Pasquale and
Ragone, 2014). Moreover, little is known about how
and why participants engage in data sharing, what priv-
acy means to those participants, what individuals think
researchers and businesses can and should do with their
data, and what users think they might gain (or lose) by
sharing their data beyond their personal social net-
works. This study contributes to the growing body of
research on the role of big data, personal data, and data
sharing in healthcare by illuminating how members of
the general public, health researchers, and health infor-
mation technology start-up companies understand the
meaning and value of user-generated health data. While
this study has global implications, it is primarily
focused on the eﬀects of policies governing health and
social data in the United States.
We began this study with the broad question: ‘‘how
is user-generated health data transforming ideas about
health, both within and beyond medical contexts?’’
However, our research quickly identiﬁed the concepts
of trust and privacy as particularly critical for shaping
the value of user-generated health data, so we narrowed
the focus of our interviews to prioritize those terms. We
deﬁne ‘‘user-generated health data’’ as data captured
through devices or software (purpose built or commer-
cially available) and used outside of traditional clinical
settings for tracking personal health data (such as wear-
able heart rate monitors, step-counters, and sleep track-
ers). For the purposes of this paper, we deﬁne ‘‘medical
contexts’’ (used interchangeably with ‘‘traditional clin-
ical settings’’) as those sites where formal doctor–
patient interaction is governed by health law such as
the Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval process governing
the use of medical devices, including some digital
health tools. Our research explores how distinctions
between clinical and nonclinical spaces and practices
are changing in the context of mobile health technolo-
gies and user-generated health data. Therefore, while
the blurring of boundaries between the clinical and
the nonclinical, or between medical and health/wellness
domains, may seem to suggest that these distinctions
are becoming less relevant (Fiore-Gartland and Neﬀ,
2015), we nonetheless recognize that existing rules
deﬁne regulatory boundaries between consumer-facing
software applications and devices (which do not require
FDA approval and are not governed by HIPAA), and
clinical-facing apps and devices (which are regulated by
FDA and HIPAA). When considering how user-gener-
ated health data travels through social and information
networks, the boundaries between the nonclinical and
the clinical remain quite relevant, with signiﬁcant impli-
cations for our study.
After the description of our research methods, the
ﬁrst section of this paper describes how the mobile
technologies that have facilitated the rise of ‘‘user-
generated data’’ have enabled new forms of autonomy
for patients and new processes of health dataﬁcation,
raising important questions about the meaning of priv-
acy and sharing in this new context. The remaining
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sections of the paper describe and analyze the key
results of our interviews. In the second section, we dis-
cuss how the concept of trust shapes users’ attitudes not
only toward sharing their health data, but also toward
their assessment of the signiﬁcance of the data itself.
The third section explains how concepts of privacy
have become more ﬂexible in relation to evolving atti-
tudes about the value of user-generated health data,
with signiﬁcant consequences for users’ willingness to
agree to device and software ‘‘terms and conditions.’’ In
contrast, in the fourth section we analyze the growing
unwillingness of individuals to participate as ‘‘human
subjects’’ in health data science, despite their willing-
ness to agree to corporate terms of use that entail com-
modiﬁcation of their privacy, and the implications for
models of data sharing, privacy, and trust.
Methods
We ﬁrst conducted a literature review of academic,
journalistic, and gray literature focused on key concepts
in user-generated health data, such as quantiﬁcation,
big data, mobile technology, and digital health. The
results highlighted the interconnections between indus-
try and the academy, as health researchers are adapting
consumer-facing wearable technologies in their work,
while health technology companies are drawing on
behavioral science to validate and promote the claims
of their devices. Widespread consumer adoption of
health-tracking devices has demonstrated the accept-
ance of these relatively new technologies outside of clin-
ical settings. Our aim was to characterize and critically
interrogate how diﬀerent groups of stakeholders under-
stood the concepts of trust and privacy through a meth-
odological approach that bridged discourse analysis,
ethics, and science and technology studies. The study
protocol was approved by an Institutional Review
Board.
On the basis of our literature review we identiﬁed
three target populations to interview, according to the
following inclusion criteria: participants must be
healthy adults and either: researchers who interact
with user-generated data, employees of a business that
interacts with user-generated data, or members of the
general public who interact with user-generated data.
Researchers included behavioral and computational
scientists, businesses included health information tech-
nology start-up companies (including software and
device developers), and members of the general public
included individuals who use wearable devices or apps
to capture their own health data. Together, these three
groups cover the spectrum of actors who, through their
professional and everyday activities, shape the ideas
around and practices of using technologies that pro-
duce user-generated health data.
We initially conducted informal, unstructured inter-
views with three researchers and three start-up compa-
nies to help us further identify core issues for these
groups. On the basis of those interviews, we developed
semistructured interview scripts for each cohort. The
interview questions for the researchers and start-ups
were closely aligned and focused on what kinds of
data our interlocutors used in their research or busi-
ness; what role user-generated data played in their
work, whether they had to develop novel consent pro-
cedures or terms of use for user-generated data; how
they saw this type of data as diﬀerent from other forms
of data, whether there were new business or research
challenges that arose from user-generated data,
whether new privacy and security issues emerged from
this type of data; and what they saw as the major bene-
ﬁts of working with this new kind of data. We recruited
participants from September 2015 to January 2016 by
networking with local experts to identify 10 researchers
and 10 start-up companies to interview. We completed
nine researcher and six start-up interviews over four
weeks from January to February 2016, mostly in
person at their oﬃces, occasionally over the phone.
The interview questions for end users (members of
the general public) were shaped by published literature
reporting users’ attitudes toward health-tracking
devices, as well as informal ethnography with users in
the local community. The questions asked were what
kind of device was used for tracking health data, what
they used it for, when and why they started using it,
how they use it on a daily basis, whether they see this
kind of health data as diﬀerent from data they might
receive in a clinical setting, whether they share their
data with anyone else, why or why not, whether they
think anyone else has access to their data, whether they
read the terms and conditions for the device, and what
they like or dislike about using the device. Through
convenience sampling over four weeks in February
and March 2016, we conducted 17 interviews with an
average length of 20 minutes each by approaching
members of the general public in three highly traﬃcked
urban parks. Our participation rate was approximately
80%. Upon completion of 32 interviews, the recordings
were transcribed and the interviews were manually
coded by six members of the research team, using
an inductive approach to identify latent themes in
the data.
Autonomy and health datafication
in an age of user-generated culture
The emergence of user-generated health data—as dis-
tinct from clinical health data—is part of a larger zeit-
geist of ‘‘user-generated culture’’ that has captured the
attention of individuals, corporations, hospitals, and
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governments within the past decade (Fu¨ller, 2016).
Entities like Uber, AirBnB, and Tinder are keystone
examples of how devices and the data they produce
have transformed their respective industries through
new patterns of digital intermediation (Benghozi and
Paris, 2016). While user-generated health data appears
to be part of a larger cultural trend in mobile device
integration, healthcare is a unique domain with a spe-
ciﬁc set of histories, demands, and stakes that do not
necessarily apply to rideshare networks, real estate
tourism, or romantic match-making services.
Mobile health technologies now enable users to
accrue large volumes of real time and longitudinal
health data, using methods not typically possible in
traditional clinics or ‘‘analog’’ self-tracking journals
(Cortez et al., 2014). These user-driven practices gener-
ate new types of health data that avoid many of the
infrastructures and actors traditionally involved in
healthcare and health decision-making. As improved
methods for collecting, processing, and storing large
datasets are developed, the big health data generated
by individual patients may redeﬁne our conceptions of
health, disease, and what it means to be a patient (Fox
and Duggan, 2013; Topol, 2015). The practices sur-
rounding user-generated health data do not merely
convey information; they mediate medical knowledge
and help to construct meaning that bridges health
and medical domains (Neﬀ and Nafus, 2016; Ostherr,
2013). These practices of technomediation provide an
important context for understanding what contempor-
ary scholars have called ‘‘dataﬁcation,’’ a process of
‘‘rendering into data aspects of the world not previ-
ously quantiﬁed’’ (Kennedy et al., 2015). Practices of
dataﬁcation also involve the transformation of existing
data into actionable forms that generate diverse
and unevenly distributed forms of value for their
producers and consumers (Van Dijck, 2014).
Contemporary practices of health dataﬁcation occur
both within and beyond clinical settings, posing chal-
lenges to traditional understandings of agency and
ownership of medical data (Health Information and
the Law Project, 2015).
Alongside and overlapping user-generated health
data’s relation to ‘‘user-generated culture’’ is the emer-
ging phenomenon of patient-generated health data
(PGHD). Like user-generated health data, PGHD
often relies on mobile devices to generate health data.
Unlike user-generated health data, PGHD is typically
enfolded within traditional healthcare ecosystems that
include existing privacy infrastructure governed by
HIPAA, the Common Rule, and other federal and
state regulations (Deering et al., 2013; Thorpe and
Gray, 2015). With user-generated health data and the
mobile devices that produce them, issues related to
privacy and data sharing do not simply evolve within
an existing healthcare ecosystem, but potentially for-
mulate an entirely new type of healthcare.
Importantly, user-generated health data from com-
mercial devices are not easily integrated into clinical
settings (Chung and Basch, 2015; Luxton et al., 2012).
Most patients cannot simply bring their Fitbit data to
their cardiologist and expect to receive recommenda-
tions based on those data. While a provider could ‘‘pre-
scribe’’ the use of a commercial tracking device for a
patient to monitor her cardiovascular activity, incor-
porating the data from that device into the patient’s
electronic health record (EHR) would pose signiﬁcant
legal and regulatory challenges. With few exceptions,
user-generated health data presently has no place
within formal EHR-based medical documentation sys-
tems, rendering it invisible in the majority of doctor–
patient encounters (Kish and Topol, 2015). Conversely,
health-related device and software companies operating
outside of hospitals, clinics, and other HIPAA-pro-
tected zones face few restrictions on their exploitation
of users’ data, as consumers must agree to ‘‘terms and
conditions’’ to activate and use the app. In many cases,
those terms of use permit the parent company to sell
users’ health data to third parties, including marketers,
advertisers, and other types of data brokers (Shklovski
et al., 2014).
While the users who generate health data outside of
clinical settings may be vulnerable to third-party
exploitation, many see self-tracking tools that put
health measurement and quantiﬁcation into the hands
of ordinary users as a democratizing force that chal-
lenges traditional doctor–patient knowledge hierar-
chies. Activists engaged in the Quantiﬁed Self and
e-patient movements (Ferguson et al., 2007; Nafus
and Sherman, 2014) seek to transform the process of
health dataﬁcation into a process of health data making
(Pybus et al., 2016) that generates value for the individ-
uals whose bodies generate the data, rather than solely
for the corporations who manufacture those devices or
provide formal healthcare services to those bodies (Van
Dijck and Poell, 2016). Ironically, concern for the need
to protect patient health information through overly
cautious adherence to HIPAA guidelines has con-
strained the expansion of patient autonomy into
clinical domains, as new methods for sharing patient
data, enabled by electronic communication technolo-
gies, have raised concerns regarding ownership, conﬁ-
dentiality, and control (Strauss, 2012; Wilkes, 2015).
Paradoxically, some users are more willing to share
their health data on an app than with their healthcare
provider (Wortham, 2016). This may result from the
device’s sociotechnical infrastructure: the social net-
working capacity that enables users to share their
health data is often a key feature in product
design and a central marketing component for many
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health-related apps on mobile devices. With Fitbit,
for example, social media connectivity allows users to
compare their data and ‘‘compete’’ within their social
networks (Nakhasi et al., 2014). Thus, the barriers to
sharing user-generated health data within formal
healthcare settings are elided by the seeming openness
of consumer-facing health apps designed to cultivate
unrestricted data sharing (Kim, 2014) outside of clin-
ical settings. The contradiction between the restrictive
view of data sharing within medicine and the permis-
sive view of data sharing outside of medicine cultivates
a sense of uncertainty among users about the value
of privacy and trust on one hand, and openness
and sharing on the other. The asymmetry of
opportunities for user-generated data to serve the
goals of patients inside versus outside of clinical set-
tings points to the conﬂicting conceptual models that
characterize these ecosystems today. These contradic-
tions are giving rise to new attitudes toward privacy
and sharing as well as new understandings of the
meaning and value users can derive from quantiﬁed
health data.
Trusting and sharing numerical data
A core tenet of science and technology studies is that
empirical evidence is social and situated, rather than
objective and neutral (Latour and Woolgar, 1979).
Numerical data, in particular, are not to be trusted
absolutely but instead considered as contingent out-
comes of the social practices that yield them (Porter,
1996). Thus, all data are ‘‘user generated.’’ Notably,
our diverse sets of interviewees seemed to share this
viewpoint as they reﬂected upon the importance of situ-
ating data within networks in order to divine the sig-
niﬁcance of given numbers. Each group enacted distinct
practices to materialize user-generated data as a social
object.
Following our preliminary interviews, the topic of
trust in numbers, and trust in data, became an animat-
ing concern that directed the course of our study.
Researcher–interviewees highlighted the fact that user-
generated data came from diverse sources ‘‘in the wild’’
and as a result, they were less secure as evidence than
data gathered through controlled experiments. By col-
lecting user-generated data from novel sites, researchers
expanded the scope of their work; however, the new
methodologies raised concerns about how these new
streams of data were to be interpreted and trusted. As
one researcher told us: ‘‘The data we have now has
surpassed our conceptual model’s abilities to tell us
exactly what to do.’’ New models are needed in order
to put the numbers into scholarly narratives.
Interdisciplinary alliances that brought together diverse
genres of expertise facilitated this practice.
In interviews with end users, the topic of trust cen-
tered on the submission of their personal data into
worlds beyond their technological hardware.
Individuals who were less professionally trained in the
interpretation of numerical data gained insights into
the personal and social signiﬁcance of their data by
sharing it with others. Like science and technology stu-
dies scholars, our interviewees situated themselves and
their devices within networks (Haraway, 1988). When
we asked how they understood the meaning of the term
‘‘user-generated data,’’ our interlocutors emphasized its
emergence from multiple origins and its circulation
through multiple domains. User-generated data, they
said, is marked by its immediacy and ubiquity, its ‘‘big-
ness,’’ and ‘‘speed,’’ as well as its travels. Encounters
with user-generated data are organized through rela-
tions across scales and domains, from personal to insti-
tutional collaboration and from behavioral strategies to
epistemological maneuvers. The particularities of these
distinct assemblages guided users’ management and
interpretation of their data.
Surprisingly, our interviewees expressed little concern
about sharing their user-generated health data with cor-
porate actors. They expressed much greater interest in
the ways that their data was purposefully shared with
known members of their social networks. Several Fitbit
users described sharing their daily step counts with
others, and emphasized that viewing others’ data
inspired them to walk more. Their network was com-
posed of themselves, their devices, and the friends that
they shared their data with. Numbers were relative. By
relating one’s personal number to the number of a friend
who they could socially situate—as a person of a certain
age, with a certain job, in a certain location—these end
users measured the signiﬁcance of their own data. By
interpreting their daily step count within the context of
this network, they drew motivation that propelled their
physical body onward.
In contrast, the researchers we interviewed inter-
preted data with attention to the diverse genres of
expertise that made their research agenda possible.
Every investigator who was involved in projects con-
cerning user-generated data was part of a collaborative
and interdisciplinary team. As one researcher said:
I think modern science is all about teams now. It’s like
mapping the human genome happened because we
threw really large, smart teams of people at that prob-
lem to be able map it. It’s the same way now with a lot
of the new stuﬀ. [. . .] I think the old way of people
toiling away solitarily in their lab are generally going
away. I collaborate on—all my current grants have
electrical engineers on them. They have computer sci-
entists. They have computational scientists on them.
They often have geneticists. I don’t know what to do
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with any of those. [. . .] We work as a team and actually
using big data, but there are speciﬁc people that actu-
ally do the computational models because they’re far
beyond me.
Bioengineers, software developers, psychologists, and
others combined their complementary expertise in
order to enact their research design. Each recognized
the involvement of their collaborators as essential,
often admitting that they were unqualiﬁed to perform
that work themselves. In this way, the diﬃculty of trust
in numbers materialized through user-generated data
collection is resolved through trust in collaborators
who together establish the viability of this type of
data as evidence.
Businesses, on the other hand, situated data within
networks composed of hospitals, physicians, patients,
government regulators, and hackers—each with their
own perspectives and capacities. They, too, entered
relations with other genres of expertise to manage
their enterprise. As an employee from one healthcare
start-up said: ‘‘you have to get a consultant who’s
familiar with what you’re collecting and familiar with
that landscape in order to come and help you under-
stand any regulation around it [. . .] there are social,
moral, other considerations as well.’’ Unlike other
interviewees, the primary goal of start-ups was not to
materialize numbers that could be put toward self-
realization or scholarly argument; rather, their goals
were ﬁnancial. As such, they strategically managed
the complexities of the networks they worked within.
This task centered on the enclosure of data to ensure
patient privacy and proprietary rights, and as a result
the social voyages of data became less of an enactment
of meaning and more of a threat to be managed.
Despite the enhanced technological features of cloud
computing, for example, an employee from another
healthcare start-up warned that ‘‘pushing the data out-
side the hospital is a challenge, so if you wanted to store
and process data in the cloud it’s just not gonna happen
right now because hospitals don’t want to put their
data outside the networks.’’ Another employee noted
that ‘‘instead of building things ourselves, we will use as
much premade items as possible to reduce any of our
risk.’’ Indeed, while they stated that the emergence of
large and comprehensive datasets could make health-
care more eﬃcient and eﬀective, they identiﬁed the bar-
riers that privacy advocates and competing business
enterprises placed upon the circulation of data as a
hindrance.
Because of its immensity and immediacy, user-gen-
erated data oﬀers unique possibilities to those who
encounter it. However, these traits also make it diﬃcult
for any one individual to interpret this data in isolation
from other individuals and other datasets. By locating
user-generated data within networks, its signiﬁcance
came into sharper focus as points of contrast and
genres of expertise were brought to bear on discon-
nected and incomplete numbers.
Privacy as flexible cultural artifact
Data privacy and security have become major topics of
concern in the post-Snowden era (Pybus et al., 2016),
with special emphasis on the vulnerability of health
data (Dockery, 2016; Ornstein, 2015). As one interlocu-
tor noted, health and ﬁnancial data constitute sensitive
objects that need careful management and protection.
However, we found that concerns about privacy in
healthcare diﬀer in substance, depending on the
actor’s position and stakes in the chain of data collec-
tion, storage, and use. Thus, health data privacy is not
a stable natural object that has value regardless of the
subjects who enact it; rather, health data privacy is a
multifaceted cultural artifact that becomes assembled
and maintained within a complex ecology of alliances
and disconnections.
A recent survey by the Pew Research Center found
that most Americans ‘‘strongly agree’’ that maintaining
privacy and conﬁdentiality in their everyday activities is
important (Madden and Rainie, 2015). Yet, we found
that very few individuals we interviewed held these con-
cerns. When asked whether they thought that their data
was being used by anyone for purposes that they were
unaware of, one respondent replied: ‘‘They might be. I
don’t really care if they do or not . . .’’ Almost all our
interviewees agreed that they might have shared their
health data with third parties, without being fully
aware. Some assumed that corporations such as
Apple collect their data automatically, with the purpose
of producing more technologically sophisticated—and
thus, ‘‘better’’—services and devices. Most did not
actively think about how their data was viewed by the
companies that manufacture the devices and apps.
When pressed, most felt that the manipulation of this
data by other parties was innocuous, since it was likely
only valuable in the aggregate, in their view.
While users were generally aware that consenting to
a company’s terms of use constitutes a legal contract,
very few reported actually reading those agreements
before consenting to them. One participant com-
mented: ‘‘Do I ever read ‘terms of use’? Did I actually
read the consent form I just signed? No. I just agree to
everything like I do for all of my Apple updates. Agree.
Agree. Done. So, no.’’ Attitudes like this one appear to
be the norm, and they highlight the contrast between
the widespread concern captured by the Pew survey
described above and the casual attitudes associated
with informal, social settings for user-generated health
data sharing.
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Similarly, a survey of over 10,000 users in 20 diﬀer-
ent countries (Internet Society, 2012) asked: ‘‘What are
the main reasons you accept the terms and conditions
as oﬀered, without reading them?’’ A full 42% of
respondents noted the length of the document, while
19% of respondents indicated that the legal termin-
ology was diﬃcult to understand, and 11% selected
‘‘I don’t have a choice if I want to complete an activity
that I need to complete.’’ These responses indicate that
users feel they have no agency in controlling access to
their data. Notably, the inclusion criteria for this study
selected for interviewees who already use some form of
software or app to capture health data, and therefore,
we could only include individuals who have already
consented to the provider’s terms of use. Indeed, the
widespread use of self-tracking devices and smartphone
apps oﬀers a proxy measure of public willingness to
agree to terms and conditions to facilitate participation
in digital health.
But if personal privacy is as important as public
debate and the experiences of researchers (described
below) would suggest, further explanation of this
behavior is needed. In his discussion of ‘‘digital
market manipulation,’’ legal scholar Ryan Calo
describes the cognitive overload that users experience
when faced with the prospect of reading through the
multiple pages of ‘‘legalese’’ that constitute the average
terms of use document:
. . . too much or extraneous information is said to
underlie a host of departures from rational decision-
making. For example, ‘information overload’ causes
consumers to rely on heuristics or rules of thumb,
shortcuts which are sometimes faulty. The phenom-
enon of ‘wear out,’ which suggests consumers tune
out messages they see too often, renders product warn-
ings less eﬀective. (Calo, 2014: 1012)
The length, complexity, and ubiquity of these agree-
ments may be leading end users to forego control
over their health data because the ‘‘heuristics or rules
of thumb’’ that they operate under lead them to believe
that the entity who is collecting the data will not use it
maliciously. It may surprise many users to know that
the major wearable technology companies all reserve
the right to share personal, identiﬁable data in the pro-
cess of business deals (Fitbit, 2015; Garmin, 2014;
Jawbone, 2014; Misﬁt, 2015). Furthermore, these com-
panies have virtually no restrictions on the ways that
they may use and sell aggregated, unidentiﬁable data
that they collect on the users of their technologies.
‘‘[T]he law’s always behind technology,’’ one researcher
commented, indicating that legal categories available
today and newly developed technological solutions do
not neatly map onto each other.
However, some users proactively reframe their con-
cerns about privacy by emphasizing their acquired cap-
acity to monitor their own health and ﬁtness levels,
practice preventative self-care, and thereby potentially
avoid costly medical services. Although some expressed
laughingly that they probably should care more about
third-party use of their health data, the majority of our
interviewees said they did not think about it much.
Given the terms of use, interviewees indicated that
they value using their health-tracking apps more than
they value their data privacy. As several interviewees
suggested, attitudes toward privacy in healthcare are
changing, under the conditions of rapid technological
change and its impact on patterns of sociality. Another
interviewee observed,
What we never thought we would post is being posted
by the people who thought that they would never post-
. . . the deﬁnition of privacy will completely change as
we move forward. . . .We’re actually quite adaptive. It
will change. Maybe that’s actually the reason why as a
species we are very successful, because we change with
what we feel has value for us.
Our research suggests that the concept of privacy itself
is undergoing change in the public consciousness, and
the legal system has not kept pace.
Human subjects in data science
Participants in data science research appear as sources
of data and as protected legal subjects. Researchers
working with user-generated health data thus require
sophisticated technical knowledge and skills to deiden-
tify collected data, police access to those data, and
ensure that any public appearance or use of the data
is in full compliance with the law. Yet these assurances
have done little to persuade participants that their priv-
acy will be protected in research settings. Several
researchers engaged in the development of new health
technologies reported considerable diﬃculty engaging
study participants:
When I would mention, hey, here is the type of data we
collect. It immediately puts some people in a very alert,
semi-panic mode. This is way too much information
you are collecting about people. I think the reason is
that we hear a lot of stories of how perhaps diﬀerent
companies know a lot about us. Or maybe government
knows a lot about us. I try to tell them there’s a diﬀer-
ence between the two approaches. One is being, you are
being tracked without you being told, and without you
knowing who is likely looking at it . . .However, in this
situation the way we collect data actually is completely
diﬀerent. It’s a fully informed situation where the
Ostherr et al. 7
participant or the patient is actually told what informa-
tion will be collected, right. Even the method of collec-
tion. At the same time, they’re also told who will likely
look at it, and what they plan to do with it. Then, in
fact, they are given guarantees that this data will be
sandboxed to the point that only these two or three
people can actually look at it.
The reticence to consent to research governed by
Common Rule and HIPAA regulations contrasts shar-
ply with our interviewees’ reported comfort with data
collection by for-proﬁt companies who are not behol-
den to HIPAA guidelines at all (see Comstock, 2016).
This contrast reﬂects larger contradictions around
issues of privacy, sharing, and trust as health data
crosses boundaries between clinical and social domains.
As Metcalf and Crawford (2016) and Zwitter (2014)
have argued, the ﬁeld of big data research is rapidly
outpacing the ability of institutional ethics regulations
to keep pace, leading to major disputes over the mean-
ing of ethical human subjects research in data science.
‘‘[H]ow a particular patient feels versus how the general
public feels about the same data’’ matters, as one
researcher mentioned, gesturing at diﬀerent emotional
responses and conceptual vocabularies around privacy
that he encounters in his work with user-generated
health data.
The cultivated loyalty to privacy as a weapon in the
cyberwar over personal data prompts broader, more
systemic thinking about the conditions in which
health becomes expressed as an individual responsibil-
ity and concern. As various thinkers (Foucault, 2009;
Rabinow and Rose, 2006) have argued, health and bio-
logical vitalities are major analytics for governing indi-
viduals and populations in contemporary states. In
neoliberal environments with receding welfare provi-
sions and strong emphasis on personal autonomy and
independence, resilient health and vitality become mat-
ters of individual responsibility and choice (Rose,
2006). Instead of addressing larger conditions that pro-
duce toxic environments, systemic poverty, and inad-
equate social resources, contemporary discourses of
corporate and state care nurture the ideas of health
and healthcare as primarily individual concerns and
responsibilities (Jain, 2012). In this context, the impera-
tive to track and take control of one’s health, as a priv-
acy that must be defended, solidiﬁes the idea that
individuals must take full credit for maintaining and
investing in their own health and wellness.
At the same time, the connective capacities of digital
technologies create novel opportunities for alternative
‘‘data-making’’ practices (Pybus et al., 2016) that chal-
lenge the idea of personal health data as private prop-
erty that only provides individual value, security, and
wealth (Agus, 2016). One example is PatientsLikeMe,
an online platform that enables sharing of user-gener-
ated health data with a network of strangers committed
to the idea that patient-generated knowledge would
beneﬁt the community by making health management
more accessible, more supported, and less isolating.
Engaging user-generated data as a tool to connect
and relate to others, to oﬀer encouragement, or to
foster competitive spirit gives room to a diﬀerent kind
of sociality in which data is not a threat but a compo-
nent of the very social fabric. However, as Van Dijck
and Poell (2016) have argued, data use is loosely regu-
lated on many online health platforms, allowing for
commodiﬁcation and exploitation by actors with less
community-minded goals, raising once more the ques-
tion of who truly beneﬁts from big health data.
Conclusion
One of the surprising results of our interviews was that,
despite the constant reporting of large-scale data
breaches around the world (Comey, 2016), our inter-
locutors felt little concern about sharing their user-
generated health data with corporations. Why? Some
interviewees suggested that the transactional nature of
their consent overrode any concerns about privacy;
individuals had already decided that they wanted to
use a device or piece of software, so they consented to
the terms of use in exchange for access to the product
they desired. Campbell and Carlson (2002) note that
the commodiﬁcation of privacy is often presented as a
necessary feature of consumer access to popular plat-
forms such as Facebook, and the social sharing features
of technologies that produce user-generated health data
further encourage users to see ‘‘health’’ as a commodi-
ﬁed beneﬁt of the exchange of personal data. Turow
et al. (2015) have called this ‘‘the tradeoﬀ fallacy,’’
noting that most Americans feel it is impossible to
limit access to their data, and instead see digital proﬁl-
ing as inevitable. Our research also suggests that the
‘‘black box’’ (Pasquale, 2015) surrounding these trans-
actions may obscure the true nature of the exchange,
with potentially harmful results, including the wide-
spread perception that it is impossible for users to opt
out of participation in surveillance practices (Elmer,
2003). As Wilbanks and Topol (2016) have argued,
‘‘undisclosed algorithmic decision-making’’ based on
user-generated health data could lead to ‘‘discrimin-
atory health actions’’ against the very users who will-
ingly shared their own data.
Entangled with the emergent understanding of priv-
acy as ﬂexible and contextual, our research also identi-
ﬁed a new concept of communities of data sharing.
Many of our interviewees expressed a willingness to
create and share personal health data with other
users. The rhetoric of personalization and sharing
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appears to facilitate an understanding of user-generated
health data that deemphasizes the risk of exploitation
in favor of loosely deﬁned beneﬁts to individual and
social well-being. In this model, the concept of person-
alization emerges from the purposeful creation of
networks of family members or friends with whom indi-
viduals share data to motivate or make sociable their
data-tracking activities. The sense that each of these
networks is highly personal to its creator seems to over-
ride awareness of the other, less benevolent entities with
whom the data is being shared.
An interesting corollary was the idea expressed by
several researchers that data sharing by the general
public would lead to greater improvements in health
outcomes than previously possible through lab-based
research. The rhetoric of openness and sharing has
begun to frame data exchanges among researchers
just as it has shaped the practices of casual users in
online health platforms. The complex nature of user-
generated health data research has also given rise to the
formation of multidisciplinary research teams whose
members must participate in ‘‘sharing’’ across trad-
itional disciplinary boundaries to accomplish their
research objectives. In this sense, the new model of
communal data sharing can be seen as having a trans-
formative eﬀect on the conduct of scientiﬁc big health
data research as well.
Importantly though, many of the data scientists we
interviewed described signiﬁcant challenges in recruit-
ing research participants, despite the relaxed attitudes
individuals expressed about consenting to terms and
conditions that enable corporations to freely exploit
their users’ data. Our study suggests that when data
privacy is explicitly foregrounded in the process of
obtaining verbal consent, and participants are
addressed as individuals rather than as anonymous
consumers, the risk of malevolent data exploitation
appears signiﬁcantly more threatening. Ironically,
researchers who are required to participate in ethics
review procedures and follow explicit protocols for
data privacy, security, and storage are subject to con-
siderably more suspicion by members of the general
public than are the corporations that overtly participate
in data proﬁling with far less ethical supervision. Under
these asymmetrical circumstances, researchers are pena-
lized for raising public awareness of the procedures
required ethically to conduct health data research,
while businesses are free to beneﬁt without restriction.
What emerges from these seemingly contradictory
attitudes about sharing user-generated health data is a
ﬂuid, contextually speciﬁc, and social conception of
privacy. A major implication of this ﬁnding is that
there is a signiﬁcant disconnection between the regula-
tory policies governing the sharing of health data for
research and patient care, on one hand, and those
policies governing corporate practices on the other.
Moreover, there is an additional disconnection between
public discourse on threats posed to personal privacy
by data piracy, security leaks, and identity theft on one
hand, and public interest in the terms and conditions
that actually govern access to their user-generated data
on the other. These contradictions suggest that the
regulatory frameworks for managing the risks of shar-
ing user-generated health data need an overhaul that
brings them into closer conformity with the current
attitudes of the general public. At the same time, the
casual permissiveness that characterized many of our
interlocutors’ responses to our terms and conditions
question suggests that, in addition to updating our
legal frameworks for protecting and sharing user-
generated health data, we also need to engage in a
more robust public dialog about the potential beneﬁts
and harms of openly sharing health data. With recent
studies demonstrating the harms embedded in artiﬁcial
intelligence algorithms that replicate racial and other
biases of their human programmers, as well as the
growing intermediation of data sources that together
might be capable of revealing sensitive personal data
(Crawford and Calo, 2016), there is a clear need for
regulations that oﬀer consumers easily comprehensible
terms of use, with opportunities to opt out of surveil-
lance. Future research on user-generated health data
that identiﬁes and explains the eﬀects of participating
in this ecosystem—both outside and inside of clinical
settings—will provide much needed guidance to policy-
makers and patients as regulations governing data shar-
ing attempt to catch up with practices in the wild.
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